We model and estimate the incidence of the corporate income tax under imperfect competition. Identi…cation comes from variation in e¤ective marginal tax rates in the United States across industries and time. Our empirical results suggest that labor bears a signi…cant portion of the burden of the corporate income tax. In addition, we …nd that the elasticity of wages with respect to the corporate marginal e¤ective tax rate increases with industry concentration. Over all industries, our estimates suggest that a one dollar increase in corporate tax revenue decreases wages by around 60 cents.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, most OECD countries have lowered their corporate statutory tax rates.
An important yet open question is who bene…ts from corporate tax reforms.
While the methodology for assigning the burden of changes in the personal income tax is straightforward -the individual who actually pays the tax is typically assumed to bear the burden of the tax -assigning the burden of the corporate income tax has proven to be a di¢ cult and controversial undertaking. In the United States, the government agencies that produce distributional analyses of tax reforms use di¤erent assumptions when it comes to distributing the burden of the corporate income tax. The sta¤ of the Joint Committee on Taxation does not distribute the corporate income tax citing uncertainty over who actually bears the burden of the tax. At the same time, the published estimates of the Congressional Budget O¢ ce and U.S. Treasury Department assign the entire burden of the corporate tax to capital owners in proportion to their share of aggregate capital income. This incidence assumption is consistent with the results from the seminal study of Harberger (1962) .
As is well-known, the Harberger study assumed a closed-economy, …xed factors of production, perfect competition, and full factor mobility across sectors. Since Harberger's original analysis, public …nance economists have considered how relaxing di¤erent assumptions of the model will change his …nding that the corporate tax is likely borne by all owners of capital.
1 For example, once we allow for an open economy with international capital mobility, domestic owners of capital may be able to escape the tax by moving capital abroad and, as a result, domestic labor may bear a substantial burden of the corporate income tax. While researchers have built and simulated theoretical models that relax many of the assumptions of the Harberger analysis (including Harberger (1995 Harberger ( , 2006 ), there have been relatively few attempts to econometrically estimate who bears the burden of the corporate income tax.
A series of recent papers present estimates of the incidence of the corporate tax (see Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2010) , Desai, Foley and Hines (2007) , Felix (2007) and Hassett and Mathur (2010) ). Since statutory corporate tax rates do not change often within a country, these studies exploit cross-country variation to identify the impact of corporate taxes on wages. These models implicitly assume that policy makers do not react 1 See Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for an excellent review of extensions of the Harberger model. to corporate tax rate changes in the countries they compete with to attract internationally mobile capital. However, if countries engage in tax competition then corporate tax rates will be endogenous. 2 Taking tax competition into account could lead to di¤erent conclusions regarding the incidence of the corporate income tax. Not accounting for the endogeneity of corporate tax rates is one weakness of the recent work. Empirical work with cross-country data may also su¤er from omitted variable bias and measurement error (if variables used in the analysis are not measured consistently across countries).
Researchers have also used variation in state corporate tax rates to explore the impact of corporate taxes on wages (see Gyourko and Tracy (1989) , , Hines (2009), and Carroll and Prante (2010) ). But these studies have the same problem described above. If states compete over corporate tax rates, then the tax rates in the estimated equations are endogenous responses of a tax setting game and the standard OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. 3 Further, the use of formulary apportionment by the states to assess corporate tax liabilities makes it di¢ cult to measure the appropriate corporate tax rate for multijurisdictional …rms.
We take a new approach to measuring the burden of the corporate tax. We recognize that the tax burden on a marginal investment project depends on the asset mix of the project.
Since industries use di¤erent asset mixes they will face di¤erent e¤ective marginal tax rates.
We use variation in e¤ective marginal tax rates across industries and across time in the U.S.
to estimate the incidence of the corporate income tax. This approach avoids the problems of measurement error and omitted variable error that may plague the cross-country studies.
Further, limiting the analysis to one country removes the estimation problems associated with tax competition that arise in the cross-country and cross-state analyses.
The extant empirical work implicitly assumes that the corporate sector is perfectly competitive. But market structures vary across industries. The presence of strategic interaction and any resulting economic rents may have implications for incidence analysis. Corporate economic rents will arise if …rms reduce output below the competitive level. As Auerbach 2 The tax competition literature (see, for example, Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) , Altshuler and Grubert (2004) , Winner (2005) , and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008) ) has provided extensive empirical evidence of strategic interaction among national governments over corporate tax rates.
3 Recent evidence on strategic competition among the US states in tax rates includes Besley and Rosen (1998) , Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2001) , Rork (2003) , and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2007) .
(2006) points out, a tax in an industry with restricted output due to imperfect competition will be more distortionary than one in a competitive industry since it will worsen the original distortion to output. Whether tax shifting is exacerbated depends on parameters of the economy. Our empirical approach allows us to estimate the extent to which the incidence of the corporate tax varies across industry market structure.
We use the general equilibrium model presented in Davidson and Martin (1985) to show that the elasticity of wages with respect to the corporate income tax rate may increase or decrease with the industry concentration level. We use data on individual U.S. workers matched with industry-level e¤ective marginal tax rates and industry concentration ratios. (The industry concentration ratio proxies for the extent of imperfect competition in an industrythe more concentrated the industry, the less competition each …rm in the industry faces).
We …nd a statistically signi…cant and negative relationship between wage rates and industry e¤ective marginal corporate tax rates. Further, our estimates suggest that the presence and extent of imperfect competition matters for analyzing the incidence of the corporate income tax. A one percent increase in the concentration ratio increases the elasticity of wages to tax rates by 9:5 percent.
We also carry out the regression analysis at the industry level to account for the possibility that the relationship between wages and taxes is only relevant for the marginal worker in the labor market. Estimates from the industry-level regressions also point to industry competitiveness playing an important role in determining the impact of the corporate income tax on wages. Both the individual-and industry-level estimates indicate that the mean elasticity of wages with respect to the industry marginal e¤ective corporate tax rate is around -0.03. We translate our estimated wage elasticity into a labor share of the corporate income tax and …nd that the burden borne by labor of a one dollar increase in the corporate tax liability is about 60 cents. The lower bound of the labor share of the tax burden is 42 cents in our most conservative con…dence interval. The estimated labor share of the tax burden is in line with the general equilibrium simulation results in Harberger (2006) but somewhat smaller than that in Randolph (2006) . The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we brie ‡y review empirical studies of the incidence of corporate income tax. In section 3 we introduce the theoretical framework for the empirical work and in section 4 we describe the data and present our econometric speci…cation. We discuss our results and various econometric issues in section 5. In the …nal section we draw conclusions from our analysis. We provide a full derivation of our theoretical prediction as well as the industry concordance we developed to construct the dataset in the appendix.
Empirical Studies of the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax
Several recent empirical studies have estimated the e¤ect of the corporate income tax on wages using cross-country data. 4 Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2010) consider the possibility that corporations shift income taxes to workers through the wage bargaining process. They measure the e¤ect of corporate income taxes paid by …rms (as opposed to corporate tax rates) on employee compensation using data on more than 500,000 …rms in nine European countries over the period 1996 to 2003. Conditional on value-added per employee, a one dollar increase in the tax bill tends to reduce the median real wage by 49 cents. A related study by Felix and Hines (2009) using data from the year 2000 evaluates the e¤ect of U.S. state corporate income taxes on union wages and …nds that a ten percent lower state tax rate is associated with a 3.6 percent higher union wage premium. Their results suggest that union workers see a 54 cent decrease in wages for every one dollar increase in the corporate tax bill. It is important to note that these studies do not measure general equilibrium e¤ects of the corporate tax on wages but rather the impact of the tax on the outcome of the worker and …rm bargain over economic rents.
A series of studies have attempted to provide direct evidence of the general equilibrium e¤ect of the corporate income tax on wages using cross-country data. Hassett and Mathur (2010) …nd that wages are highly responsive to changes in the corporate tax rate using aggregate wage and tax data within the manufacturing sector for 72 countries between 1981 and 2002. The estimated elasticity of wages with respect to corporate income tax rates ranges from 0:4 to 0:6 across di¤erent speci…cations, indicating that a one dollar increase in tax revenue leads to a three to four dollar decrease in the real wage. As Gravelle and Hungerford (2008) point out, the large magnitude and signi…cance of this elasticity is sensitive to the use of alternative exchange rates and time intervals. In addition, by including a measure of value-added per worker as a control variable, the identi…ed tax coe¢ cient fails to capture the e¤ects of the corporate tax on wages through changes in value-added (Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni, 2010 While some have disputed the …ndings of these studies (see, for example, Gravelle and Hungerford (2008) ), this growing body of empirical work does provide suggestive evidence that labor bears a large burden of the corporate tax. However, as discussed in the introduction, much of this work uses either cross-country or cross-state data without correcting for the possible endogeneity of corporate tax rates due to tax competition. In addition, the extant literature implicitly assumes that all …rms operate in perfectly competitive markets.
We consider imperfect competition in the next section and estimate the impact of corporate taxes on wages in a setting in which changes in other countries tax rates should have no impact on our estimated coe¢ cients.
Theoretical Background
Following Harberger (1962) , we discuss the general equilibrium incidence e¤ects of the corporate income tax in the simplest setting: an economy with corporate and noncorporate sectors producing separate goods with two …xed factors of production, capital and labor. Both factors of production are mobile across sectors and the corporate income tax is modeled as an additional tax on the returns to capital in the corporate sector.
A source-based tax on the return to corporate capital a¤ects the equilibrium return to capital and labor through two channels: the output e¤ect and the factor substitution e¤ect. The output e¤ect arises because the tax drives up the price of goods in the corporate sector. As demand for the corporate sector good decreases in response to the price increase, capital and labor will be released from the corporate sector. The factor substitution e¤ect arises because in response to the tax, corporate good producers attempt to substitute labor for capital driving down the return to capital relative to labor. How the reallocation of capital and labor across sectors a¤ects the relative returns to factors in equilibrium depends on the initial allocations of capital and labor in the corporate and non-corporate sectors, the degree to which …rms in the corporate and non-corporate sectors can substitute labor for capital, and the elasticities of demand for corporate and non-corporate output. With calibrated factor shares and input/output substitution elasticities that are reasonable for the U.S. economy, Harberger (1962) …nds that capital income bears approximately the full burden of the corporate tax.
Further work including Mutti and Grubert (1985) , Harberger (1995 Harberger ( , 2006 , Gravelle and Smetters (2006) , and Randolph (2006) The assumption of perfect competition fails to characterize the structure of some U.S.
industries. Davidson and Martin (1985) (hereafter DM) capture the strategic e¤ects of imperfect competition on tax incidence in a two-sector general equilibrium model. 6 We use their model to motivate our empirical study of the extent to which the corporate income taxes are passed to labor through reductions in wages under imperfect competition. We leave the full derivation of the model to the Appendix and brie ‡y discuss the economic intuition in this section.
The economy consists of a competitive (noncorporate) and an imperfectly competitive (corporate) sector. The corporate sector has a small number of …rms. The corporate group plays a repeated game in which each …rm produces constrained quantities of a single good under constant cost. Constrained production maximizes joint corporate pro…ts subject to no cheating. At a given point of time, if any …rm produces higher output, every …rm will revert permanently to the lower Nash output level. Each …rm therefore compares the current gain from a higher output level to the present value of pro…t loss by permanently producing at a lower output level. The present value of the pro…t loss due to producing at the lower level is discounted using the return to capital.
The corporate tax has the usual output and factor substitution e¤ects. There is also another route by which the equilibrium return to factors may be a¤ected, however. The corporate tax decreases the net return to capital and this rate of return is used to discount the value of the loss due to deviating from the constrained output level. A fall in the discount rate increases the present value of the loss in pro…ts from diverting to a higher output level.
This additional e¤ect of the corporate tax works in the same direction as the output e¤ect magnifying the decrease in the return to labor (capital) when the corporate sector is labor (capital) intensive. As a result, the change in relative factor prices due to the corporate tax is larger (smaller) as the corporate sector is more capital (labor) intensive.
In the appendix, we show that the elasticity of the wage with respect to the corporate income tax rate increases as the number of …rms in the corporate sector decreases if the corporate sector is capital intensive. The result is ambiguous if the corporate sector is labor 6 See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for partial equilibrium analyses of the incidence of corporate tax under imperfect competition.
intensive, however. The sensitivity of wages to changes in the corporate income tax may increase or decrease as the number of …rms in an industry decreases. In the next section we present a model that allows us to estimate the impact of the corporate income tax on wages and test whether any impact changes with industry concentration.
Research Design and Data
We model the natural logarithm of weekly wages for individual i in industry j in year t, w ijt , as a function of the corporate tax rate (T jt ), the market concentration ratio (CR jt ), the interaction between the tax rate and the concentration ratio, as well as individual characteristics (X ij ) and industry and time-speci…c …xed e¤ects (c j and t ):
(1)
The main parameters of interest are 1 and 3 . The value of 1 measures the extent to which the corporate tax e¤ects wages, while the value of 3 indicates whether industry concentration in ‡uences how taxes impact wages.
Our measure of the industry corporate tax is the industry-level e¤ective marginal corporate tax. This summary tax measure is a function of e¤ective marginal tax rates on the assets employed in an industry. The asset-level e¤ective marginal tax rates, discussed further in the next section, are calculated taking statutory tax rates as well as tax incentives such as depreciation allowances and investment tax credits into account. The statutory rate applies to all assets and changes across our sample period. Depreciation allowances and the investment tax credit vary both across capital asset types and across time. For each industry and year, we calculate a weighted average marginal e¤ective tax rate based on the asset mix in the industry in the year being examined.
The industry-level e¤ective marginal tax rate captures how the tax incentive to invest in the average investment project di¤ers across industries and is well-suited for our incidence analysis since our goal is to identify the e¤ect of the corporate income tax on wages through its impact on factor reallocation across industries. Another advantage of the ef-fective marginal tax rate is that unobserved shocks to individual wages are unlikely to be correlated with the industry-level characteristics. Therefore, the industry-level tax and industry concentration provide plausible exogenous determinants of wages at the individual level.
Sample Selection Issues
Approximately one quarter of the observations in our sample (described below in section 4.2) have missing wages because the individual did not work, presenting a typical sample selection problem. The working sample is nonrandomly chosen, and the unobserved factors that determine the wage are likely to be correlated with the unobservables that in ‡uence one's decision to work. It is well known that a simple OLS regression on the working sample would yield biased and inconsistent estimates. 7 To correct for the sample selection bias, we add a …rst-stage selection equation, in which the probability of being employed (empl i ) depends on one's nonwork income (inc i ), education (educ i ), age, marital status (married i ), number of children younger than 5 (child5 i ), number of children between age 6 and 19 (child20 i ), and white noise (u i ):
The exclusion restriction is that nonwork income should a¤ect one's decision to work but should not impact the marginal utility from work. We measure nonwork income by aggregating net income received in the form of rents, dividends, interest, private transfers, and alimony payments. We model married women as the secondary earner of the household and include the husband's wage and salary in their nonwork income.
Data
E¤ective tax rates. We use the e¤ective marginal tax rate to capture the e¤ect of tax policy on investment. As is well-known, the marginal e¤ective tax rate is the percentage di¤erence between the pre-tax and after-tax rate of return on a marginal investment project. This rate summarizes all modeled tax provisions (the statutory tax rate, present value of depreciation allowances, and investment credits) that apply to an incremental dollar of capital investment in a hypothetical project.
We calculate the e¤ective marginal corporate tax rate for each industry by taking a weighted average of the e¤ective marginal tax rates on all of the assets used in the industry.
We obtain asset level e¤ective tax rates (ET R at ) from Fullerton and Henderson (1985) and Mackie (2002) . Both papers follow the Hall-and-Jorgenson cost-of-capital approach and compute the e¤ective marginal corporate tax rates for 34 types of investment in equipment and nonresidential structures. Cross-time variation in e¤ective tax rates comes from two sources: changes in the tax system due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and changes in macroeconomic conditions re ‡ected in the real interest and in ‡ation rates. 8 The tax rates in Fullerton and Henderson (1985) are calculated for 1982 while those in Mackie (2002) are calculated for 1992 and 1997. Both before and after TRA86, there is variation in e¤ective tax rates across assets as a result of di¤erences in depreciation schedules. Before TRA86
there is additional variation across asset types due to the presence of the investment tax credit for equipment.
We use the capital ‡ow tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.
Commerce Department to construct asset-speci…c weights for our industry-level marginal e¤ective tax rates. The capital ‡ow tables are published in the Survey of Current Business and are available approximately every …ve years. We use information for 1982, 1992 and 1997 since we have calculated marginal e¤ective tax rates for assets only for these years.
The tables provide information on new capital investment in equipment and structures by industry. We compute the weight for each asset a in industry j in year t (W ajt ) as the value of new investment relative to total industry new investment. 9 The year-speci…c industry ETR is calculated as
Industry concentration ratios. We use Economic Census data on industry revenue to calculate concentration ratios for each industry. The market concentration ratio is the total revenue of the four largest …rms relative to total industry revenue. 
Individual characteristics. Our individual-level data is from IPUMS-CPS, an integrated dataset of the randomly-sampled March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS data
provide individual-level information on wages and industry a¢ liation. We restrict our sample to full-time private sector workers between ages 17 and 65, and exclude students and those working in the armed forces. The …nal sample contains 287,111 individuals. Table 2 reports information on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample. We impute years of schooling from nine categories of educational attainment. 11 We compute work experience (Exper) as the di¤erence between age and the years of schooling minus six (Exper i = age i s i 6). Socioeconomic characteristics include annual nonwork income, an indicator for being married, age, number of children younger than 5 years old, and number of children between the ages of 6 and 20. Table 2 also reports average weekly wages for workers. As discussed in section 4.1, we model the decision to work as a function of the socioeconomic variables. The wage process is determined by the individual characteristics described above (with the exclusion of nonwork income), as well as the industry of capital across assets. This gives us an average marginal e¤ective tax rate for each industry. 10 The e¤ective tax rate calculation for each industry parallels that of Gruber and Rauh (2007) and Dwenger and Steiner (2008) . 11 We impute the number of years of schooling, s i , from the following categorical scheme of educational attainment: 1 ='None or preschool' (0 years); 2 ='1-4 grades' (2.5 years); 3 ='5-8' (6.5 years); 4 ='9' (9 years); 5 ='10'(10 years); 6 ='11'(11 years); 7 ='12'(12 years); 8 = '1-3 years of college'(14 years); 9 = '4+ years of college'(16 years). Education is measured as the highest level reported in CPS. characteristics including the e¤ective marginal corporate tax rate, concentration ratio, and the interaction term between the tax rate and concentration ratio.
Industry Comparability: NAICS, SIC and Census Code. We use data from three major sources: the BEA Capital Flow tables, the Economic Census, and the IPUMS-CPS. Each uses a di¤erent industry classi…cation system and these systems changed over the sample period. As a result, we needed to develop a uni…ed industry classi…cation. The detailed matching procedure is described in the appendix. Table A1 provides descriptions of the 41 matching industries. While this industry classi…cation is not as re…ned as the BEA's 3-digit SICs, it contains more industries than typically used in the e¤ective tax rate literature. (see, for example, Gravelle (1994) , Mackie (2002) and Gruber and Rauh (2007) ). Table 3 reports the estimated e¤ects of e¤ective marginal tax rates and concentration ratios on the weekly wage. Table 4 The remaining columns of Table 3 take imperfect competition into account. As shown in column 2, the magnitude of the estimated tax coe¢ cient decreases slightly once we control for industry concentration (although the di¤erence between the tax coe¢ cients in columns 1 and 2 is statistically insigni…cant). Columns 3 and 4 present estimates of the full model including the interaction between the tax rate and concentration ratio from the two-stage Heckman regression and maximum likelihood estimation. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term is negative and highly signi…cant. Combining the coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction term with the negative tax coe¢ cient suggests that the elasticity of wage with respect to the tax rate increases with the industry concentration level. This result suggests that for a uniform increase in the e¤ective tax rates in U.S. economy, workers in the concentrated industries bear a larger share of the corporate tax burden.
Empirical Results and Discussion

Individual-level Evidence
Industry-level Evidence
Labor economists have documented a wide dispersion in wages across industries for workers with similar socioeconomic characteristics. These industry wage premiums are highly persistent over time (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Dickens and Katz, 1987a,b) , and there is no evidence of arbitrage activities in employment movement (Dickie and Gerking, 1998; Helwege, 1992) . These …ndings suggest that labor market conditions may vary at the industry level in equilibrium, generating industry-speci…c market-clearing wage rates. If this is the case, the relevant observation for the incidence analysis will be the industry wage rate and our individual-level data will overstate the true number of degrees of freedom.
In this section we repeat our analysis at the industry level by constructing a pseudopanel of average wage rates and worker characteristics. 12 We run a …xed-e¤ect regression with the pseudo-panel and report the estimation results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 .
Both the estimated tax coe¢ cient and the interaction term remain negative and statistically signi…cant. The magnitude of these coe¢ cients are similar to the individual-level estimates.
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The regression in column 2 includes additional industry …xed e¤ects and yields a smaller tax coe¢ cient than that in column 1. It is important to control for unobserved industry heterogeneity in this setting because part of the variation in the tax rates comes from the di¤erent asset mix across industries. But the choice of asset mix does not only respond to tax incentives; it can also be determined by the unobserved industry-speci…c factors (Liu, 2011) . If the unobserved industry heterogeneity is correlated with the e¤ective marginal tax 12 By averaging across workers in an industry, we assume that the average worker is the relevant observation. 13 Several individual characteristic estimates including the education coe¢ cient lose their signi…cance in the industry-level regression due to the limited variation in averages of individual characteristics across industries.
rates, estimates of the tax coe¢ cient would be biased and inconsistent.
To address the potential aggregation bias from using industry averages, we run a twostep regression where we regress the individual wage against all individual socioeconomic characteristics with correction for sample selection bias. We then regress the industry-level residuals on tax rates, the concentration ratio, and the interaction term:
where resid jt is the industry average of residuals b " ijt from the …rst-step wage regression:
The estimation results are summarized in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 . The second-stage estimates of the tax rate and the interaction term are negative and statistically signi…cant once we control for unobserved industry heterogeneity. The magnitude of the estimates is smaller than those from the industry-average regression but con…rm our results that the elasticity of wage with respect to the tax rates decreases with industry competitiveness.
Testing the Endogeneity of Concentration Ratio
We use the concentration ratio to measure industry competitiveness, which in turn may be a¤ected by the previous decisions and pro…ts of …rms in the industry. For example, in searching for higher pro…ts, incumbent …rms can strategically increase the entry barrier and limit the number of …rms in an industry. If part of the wage payment comes from economic rents and hence correlates with the concentration level, the coe¢ cient on the OLS estimate of the concentration ratio will be biased. The coe¢ cient on the OLS estimate of the interaction between concentration ratio and the tax rate will also be biased. We therefore should test for the endogeneity of industry competitiveness using variables that are exogenous to the wage determination process.
Intensive advertising as well as research and development (R&D) can result in higher industry entry barriers. Following Symeonidis (2008) , we derive two dummy variables based on advertising and R&D intensity. We extract data from the Annual Compustat North America Industrial Files and use advertising and R&D expense relative to industry sales to measure advertising and R&D intensities. We construct a dummy variable ADV which equals 0 for industries with advertising-sales ratio lower than two percent and 1 otherwise.
The dummy variable RD is constructed in a similar fashion. It equals 0 for industries with R&D-sales ratios lower than two percent and 1 otherwise. While the levels of advertising and R&D intensities are endogenous, whether they are above or below the two percent cuto¤ point is determined by exogenous industry characteristics (Symeonidis, 2008) . For industries below the cuto¤ point, either advertising or R&D is not an important strategic variable. Most industries stay consistently either below or above the two percent level across all of the years in the sample period.
The natural market size can also a¤ect the industry concentration level due to the nature of products and associated transportation costs. Some industries such as perishable food or beverage production are geographically less mobile due to transportation costs and therefore con…ned to a smaller market size than footloose industries. We estimate the annual industrylevel transportation costs following Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2005) . Speci…cally, we regress transportation costs on a vector of industry dummies for each sample year, controlling for distance and distance squared for the 15 largest exporting partners of the United States.
We use the industry …xed-e¤ects coe¢ cient as the measure of transportation costs. Since the transportation cost data is only available for the non-service industries, we include a dummy (TMISS) taking on a value of 1 if no information on the transportation cost is available. 14 We perform the regression-based Durbin-Wu-Hausman test by regressing the concentration ratio on the e¤ective tax rates, the advertising and R&D dummies, and transportation costs:
We interact the tax rate with the …tted value of the concentration ratio \ ln CR jt from equation (2) 
Under the maintained assumption that all the explanatory variables in equation (2) and (3) are exogenous, the structural error " ijt in equation (1) should not be correlated with the reduced form error 1ijt and 2ijt . 15 To test this hypothesis, we run an augmented industrylevel two-step regression with b 1ijt and b 2ijt as additional regressors and jointly test whether the two coe¢ cients on the residuals equal zero. The resulting large p-value (0:50) indicates that we cannot reject exogeneity of either the concentration ratio or the interaction term. 
Labor Share of the Corporate Income Tax
The marginal e¤ect of changes in the e¤ective marginal corporate tax on wages varies across the distribution of the concentration ratio. At any given concentration level, the elasticity of wage with respect to the corporate tax rate is @ ln w jt @ ln T jt = 1 + 3 ln CR jt : Table 6 summarizes the wage elasticity at di¤erent quartiles of concentration ratio using both the individual-level and industry-level estimates. Overall, accounting for the e¤ect of concentration ratio, the average elasticity of wages with respect to the marginal e¤ective corporate tax rate is 0:028 using the individual-level estimates from column (3) of table 4 and 0:038 using the industry-level estimates from column (2) and (4) of table 5. Computed at di¤erent quartiles of concentration ratio, the wage elasticity increases with the concentration ratio. The wage elasticity at the fourth quartile is at least four times larger than the elasticity at the second quartile, suggesting more shifting of corporate income taxes in the more concentrated industries.
To assess the incidence of corporate income tax, we calculate the impact of a one dollar increase in corporate tax liabilities on total wages. In 1997 (the last year of our sample), total U.S. corporate income tax revenue was $182:29 billion. A ten percentage increase of the e¤ective marginal rate would raise the corporate tax revenue by $18:23 billion providing the tax base remains constant. Total U.S. wages and salaries in 1997 were $3; 874 billion.
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Assuming no adjustment in total employment, a 0:28 percent drop in the wage rate (our column 1 estimate from Table 6 ) would decrease total compensation by $10:96 billion. Hence, the burden borne by labor of a one dollar increase in corporate tax liability is around $0:60.
The 95 percent con…dence interval for the average elasticity suggests that the labor share of the tax burden lies between 59 and 61 percent of corporate tax revenue.
Labor's share of the corporate tax burden is approximately 80 percent of corporate tax revenue if we use the industry-level estimates. For every dollar increase in the corporate tax revenue, the associated 95 percent con…dence interval for the decrease in wage rate is between $0:42 and $1:19 using the industry-average estimates and between $0:62 and $1:00 using the two-step estimates. These estimates suggest that labor bears a substantial share of the tax burden. If capital and labor equally bear the burden of the tax, the share of the burden that labor bears will be in proportion to its share of income, which is around two-thirds in the United States. This rule-of-thumb estimate is close to our most conservative labor share of tax burden imputed from individual-level results, suggesting that labor possibly bears more of the corporate tax burden than its share of income.
Conclusion
We measure the responsiveness of wages to changes in corporate income taxes. We use variation in industry-level tax changes to identify the impact of corporate income taxes on wage rates within the United States, allowing di¤erences in industry concentration to a¤ect the incidence analysis. We …nd that corporate marginal e¤ective taxes rates have a negative e¤ect on workers'wages. In addition, our results suggest that the shifting of corporate taxes to wages intensi…es with the degree of industry concentration.
Our …ndings suggest that labor shares a signi…cant part of the burden of corporate income taxes. A direct calculation of the mean marginal e¤ect of the corporate income tax from our estimates suggests that a ten percentage increase in the tax rate would decrease the average wage rate by 0:28 0:38 percent. Labor shares at least 42 percent of the burden of the corporate tax and possibly more. The average labor share of the corporate tax burden is around 60 80 percent.
One important caveat is that, due to the limitation of our data structure, we are unable to study the dynamic e¤ects of corporate tax rates. While the theory of the tax incidence suggests that changes of factor input occur instantaneously with changes in the tax rates, it is likely that the adjustment process plays out over many periods and therefore, the short-run incidence may di¤er from the long-run incidence of the corporate taxes. In future research we plan to investigate the dynamics of corporate tax shifting.
In line with other empirical work on the incidence of corporate income tax, we focus on the e¤ect of corporate tax rates on wage rates. A more complete analysis would also investigate the e¤ect of the tax on employment. Distinguishing between the quantity and price e¤ects of corporate taxes remains an important topic for further research. 
A Theory
In this section we …rst summarize the Davidson and Martin (1985) (DM) model of the incidence of the corporate income tax under imperfect competition and then derive a comparative static result that describes how the degree of imperfect competition a¤ects the incidence of the corporate income tax. The comparative static result presented in the last section suggests that the wage elasticity with respect to the corporate tax is an increasing function of the industry concentration level.
A.1 Partial Equilibrium in the Corporate Sector
Suppose that there are I industries in the economy. Each industry has a corporate (imperfectly competitive) sector and a noncorporate (competitive) sector. The corporate sector has N …rms. The corporate group plays a repeated game in which each …rm produces constrained quantities of a single good X under constant cost. Constrained production maximizes the joint pro…t in the corporate sector subject to no cheating. If any …rm cheats by producing a higher quantity at time t, every …rm will revert permanently to the Nash output level. Each …rm compares the current gain from cheating to the present value of pro…t loss by permanently producing at a lower output level. The net gains from cheating
where ch denotes the pro…t from cheating, c the pro…t per …rm under constrained production, n the pro…t per …rm in the static Nash equilibrium, and r the price of capital, i.e. the interest rate.
Let Q c denote the constrained production quantity per …rm. The corporate sector chooses Q c from the set of sustainable outputs de…ned as Q fQ c : Z 0; Q c 0g. The pro…t of the corporate group is:
where P ( ; !) is the inverse demand function for good X, 18 c the constant unit cost of production and ! is a vector of shift parameters. The static Nash pro…t is:
for which DM assume the existence of a symmetric solution. Lastly, the pro…t from cheating is:
Focusing on the special case in which the representative consumer has a utility function of the form:
the inverse demand curve for X is:
where M is the total income, and is the budget share of good X.
Substituting equation (8) into pro…t functions (6) and (7), DM solve for n and ch .
Further substituting n ; ch and c into equation (4) and setting Z(Q c ) = 0; DM solve for
The inverse demand curve for X now becomes
In general, the inverse demand function under cooperation is a function of the basic parameters in the model:
In the perfect competition case, r represents the net return to capital and a¤ects the output price by increasing the cost of production c: Under imperfect competition, r enters (11) as problem.
a separate argument. This separate e¤ect captures the impact of the price of capital on the pricing decision of the corporate group. Speci…cally,
The …rst term in (12) is positive since an increase in r increases the cost of capital. The second term in (12) is negative since an increase in r represents a greater inducement to increase output, which leads to a lower price. It captures the additional e¤ect of r on prices under imperfect competition. The overall impact of r on the price depends on the relative magnitude of these two e¤ects.
A.2 The Corporate Sector in General Equilibrium
Now consider the corporate sector as part of the standard two-sector general equilibrium model. There are two goods in each industry, X and Y: Perfect competition prevails in the Y sector, while the behavior of …rms in the corporate sector (X) is characterized as above.
Both sectors employ capital (K) and labor (L) both of which are fully mobile between sectors.
All …rms are price takers in the capital market.
Following standard notation, q j is the gross-of-tax output price of good j, c j the unit cost function for good j; w and r the net returns to labor and capital, respectively, T j one plus the ad valorem output tax on good j, T ij one plus the partial factor tax on input i used in the production of good j, and M the aggregate income.
Assuming Z(Q c ) > 0; the gross price in the corporate sector is given by
Assuming perfect competition in the Y sector, the price of Y equals the marginal cost of production:
Aggregate demands for the two products are
and all income is spent in equilibrium
We also assume …xed supplies of labor (L 0 ) and capital (K 0 ) and full employment:
where c ij are the partial derivatives of the jth unit cost function with respect to the ith factor and represent the ith input requirement per unit of output of the jth good.
For simplicity, DM choose w as the numeraire and drop equation (15) from the system, leaving six equations in six unknowns. Substituting the behavior of the corporate sector characterized by equation (10) into (13) yields
Finally, di¤erentiating (14) and (20) we get
where the circum ‡ex denotes proportional change, = Lx Kx measures the value of factor intensity, and Lj wc Lj T j =c j measures labor's share in industry j. The second term 
where j > 0 the elasticity of substitution between K and L in the production of the jth good with respect to a change in relative rental prices,
Lx
Kx where ij c ij =i 0 measures the share of factor i in industry j, and a j Kj Lj + Lj Kj > 0: Equations (21)- (23) A tax on capital in the corporate sector T Kx decreases the net return of capital r. Note that r has two e¤ects on the oligopolistic sector: it allocates the …xed supply of capital between industries and measures time preference. In the latter role, the level of r determines the present value of pro…t loss due to cheating. A fall in r reduces the inducement to cheat, and allows the cartel to sustain a lower output and higher price.
In particular, by setting b (21)- (23) and solving for the elasticities of relative outputs, prices, and factor returns, the impact of a corporate income tax is characterized by the following system of equations:
where D a x x + a y y + ( + ) and is positive for stability. 19 As in the standard model of tax incidence, the corporate tax T Kx induces an output e¤ect Kx and a factor substitution e¤ect a x x in the right-hand side of equation (24). Recall that = Lx Kx measures the relative factor intensity in the corporate sector. If the corporate sector is labor intensive, i.e. > 0, the output e¤ect will increase r/w. On the other hand, the factor substitution e¤ect will unambiguously decrease r/w. The e¤ect of imperfect competition, , a¤ects D in the same direction as the sign of the measure of physical factor intensity,
. If the corporate sector is labor intensive, imperfect competition leads to a larger D and consequently a smaller elasticity.
A.3 Comparative Statics with Imperfect Competition
We are particularly interested in how the tax e¤ect on wages varies with industry concentration. To explore this question we derive the …rst-order condition of factor prices with respect to the number of …rms in the corporate sector. Writing out equation (24) explicitly, we have
Since percentage deviations from equilibrium equal the natural log-deviations up to …rst order, we have
where c = ln w ln r ln T Kx , the di¤erence in pre-perturbation equilibrium values.
20
Rearranging we get
De…ne wT the elasticity of wage with respect to the corporate income tax. It depends on 20 T Kx = 0 before the introduction of capital tax in the X sector.
the basic parameters as follows:
Based on equation (30), we derive two key observations. First, wT is negative if Kx a x x > 0, for which a necessary condition is that the corporate sector in the U.S. is labor intensive. Second, wT depends on the degree of industry competitiveness. Speci…cally,
As we know that
the elasticity of wage with respect to corporate tax rate decreases with the number of …rms in the corporate sector if the corporate sector is capital intensive, or alternatively, if the corporate sector is labor intensive and the output e¤ect dominates the factor substitution e¤ect. For a given positive di¤erence between the output and substitution e¤ect, a small number of …rms implies a large share of joint pro…t for each …rm, and alternatively, a smaller gain from cheating. In this case, the tax-induced change in the return to capital would imply a large pro…t loss from diverting to a higher output level in present value. Consequently, the additional e¤ect of corporate tax due to imperfect competition works in the same direction as the output e¤ect, and has the strongest impact on wages in the least competitive industries. 
B.1 The Uni…ed Industry Classi…cation
The …rst step in creating a uni…ed industry series is to create the baseline industry categories.
This baseline classi…cation is constrained by the most aggregated classi…cation system in the data sources, the industry groups in the 1992 BEA capital ‡ow 22 For example, information is only availabe for transportation and warehousing in 1972, while in 1982 detailed information are available for each of the subcategories including railroad transportation (40,474), local and interurban passenger transportation (41), trucking and warehousing (42), water transportation (44), transportation by air (45), pipeline, except natural gas (46), transporation services (472, 473, 478) . 23 With the excpetion that the Transportation Equipment class is based on the 3-digit SICs. 
B.2 Match with SICs and NAICS
B.3 Match with CICs
For this match, we rely on the census'classi…ed index of industries and occupations, which provides a crosswalk between the title of each industry and its 3-digit SICs. We assign each There are no crossover changes. Additional individual characteristics included in the regression are number of children younger than 5, number of children between 6 and 20, and marrital status. Standard errors in parentheses. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%. This is the …rst-stage equation which corrects for sample selection bias in the wage equation. Standard errors in parentheses. * signi…cant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%. (1) where resid jt is obtained from the …rst-step regression ln w
Robust standard erros in parentheses. * signi…cant at 10*** signi…cant at 1 
